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Abstract—Automatic Speaker Verification (ASV) is the process
of identifying a person based on the voice presented to a system.
Different synthetic approaches allow spoofing to deceive ASV
systems (ASVs), whether using techniques to imitate a voice
or recunstruct the features. Attackers try to beat up the ASVs
using four general techniques; impersonation, speech synthesis,
voice conversion, and replay. The last technique is considered
as a common and high potential tool for spoofing purposes
since replay attacks are more accessible and require no technical
knowledge from adversaries. In this study, we introduce a novel
replay spoofing countermeasure for ASVs. Accordingly, we used
the Constant Q Cepstral Coefficient (CQCC) features fed into an
autoencoder to attain more informative features and to consider
the noise information of spoofed utterances for discrimination
purpose. Finally, different configurations of the Siamese network
were used for the first time in this context for classification.
The experiments performed on ASVspoof challenge 2019 dataset
using Equal Error Rate (EER) and Tandem Detection Cost
Function (t-DCF) as evaluation metrics show that the proposed
system improved the results over the baseline by 10.73% and
0.2344 in terms of EER and t-DCF, respectively.
Index Terms—Spoof detection, Replay Attack, ASVspoof Chal-
lenge, CQCC, Autoencoder, Siamese Network
I. INTRODUCTION
Speech can be considered as one of the most important
means of communication for the human. Each individual
has a unique voice pattern, identifiable as a signature. This
pattern helps people to identify the other communication end.
Consequently, tremendous low-cost technologies have been
developed based on voice as a biometric feature for identity
recognition [1] known as Automatic Speaker Verification
systems (ASVs). ASV captures different clues such as
intonations and vocal tract shapes in order to verify a persons
identity [2]. On the other hand, there are techniques available
to synthesize the voice or its characteristics [3][4]. This
provides a great opportunity for spoofing, where the attacker
exploits a specific speaker’s voice to spoof an ASV system.
Besides, advances in the channel and noise detection and
removal of their effects have made the ASV application
suitable for market usage. The issue become severe when
it comes to e-commerce1 and smartphone logical access
scenarios [5]. These ASVs mostly use short-term spectral
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features which are very vulnerable to spoofing attacks.
Accordingly, the research effort mainly investigates four types
of attacks to address this problem: impersonation, speech
synthesis, voice conversion, and replay. By mimicking the
human voice or even alter that, attackers deceive the ASVs,
for the first category . Formant extraction (F0, F1, andF2) is a
regular feature based approach to spot spoof in this category
[3][6][7]. The second category focuses on Text to Speech
(TTS) approaches where a system synthesizes a text to
generate the voice. In the third category, the voice of a person
is converted from one person to the target speaker and then
it is presented to ASVs for spoofing [8][9]. Finally, attackers
take use of recorded voices from the genuine speakers for
spoofing, to form a replay attack. Several studies extract
features from speech and classify spoof/genuine utterances
[10][11]. However, there are problems still remaining out of
attention. As [12] mentioned, one of the important aspects
to consider is determining which features or classifiers are
better for discrimination. Furthermore, transforming features
into space with a more informative context for discrimination
is also an interesting research direction should be considered.
Here in this work, we employ the Siamese networks for the
first time as a classifier to increase the level of discrimination
strength between the extracted features. Although Siamese
networks were used for spoofing detection tasks such as
a discrimiative feature extraction [13], the performance of
such networks as a classifier is overlooked in ASVs. Our
motivation for using such a method is owing to the fact
that Siamese networks are applicable to tasks including
measuring similarity or determining relationships between
two comparable subjects [14]. In such tasks, two identical
subnetworks are usually used to process the two injected
inputs, and another module takes the outputs of these two
sub-networks and makes the final decision. Siamese networks
can be fed by two sets of features and after taking the final
output from the output layer, they will use a distance measure
in order to spot an input as a spoof/non-spoof sample.
In this study, we also extract CQCCs as basic features
from both genuine and spoof samples. Since these features
are sparse and raw, we feed them to autoencoders to have
compressed and more discriminative features. In particular,
our motivation for using autoencoder in this context is
due to the fact that replay speech suffers from channel or
convolutional noise, since the recording process is performed
by two microphones, through one loudspeaker [15]. As a
result, noise detection is one of the other aspects of replay
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2spoofing detection as it is one of the most important factors
in the successful adaptation of ASVs in the market place. For
instance, in [16], a robust system is developed to improve
Deep Neural Network (DNN) performance by using noisy
data from channels. This type of systems is called Noise
Aware systems, where noise is introduced to the system, in
order to help the system to detect spoofing attacks especially
for replay ones. In this study, Autoencoder Neural Netowork
is employed, due to their prior success in extracting the noise
as latent variable, given the same noisy input as the network’s
output [17][18]. We trained the autoencoder in order to
consider the noise and extract an informative representation
of basic features, capable of representing both meaningful
and sparse features related to original samples. Moreover, in
contrast with other feature reduction and selection methods no
feature is excluded, Hence, for both clean and noisy speech
all features are preserved. Finally, in order to have contextual
representation of features, we first feed them to Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) and then share the weights of CNN
with another CNN identical to the first CNN and afterwards,
they are employed in Siamese network. Siamese networks
extract the similarity or a connection between two inputs and
result in a significant discriminative classification.
In the following, first we list the related studies in Section II,
then we will define the models of our works in Section III.
Subsequently, the proposed system is introduced in Section
IV. Next, we give a brief explanation of the experimental
setup in Section V. In Section VI, we discuss experimental
results and finally, make the conclusion and propose future
works in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Different techniques are proposed based on physiological
and behavioral clues used for identification. Four types of
Spoof attacks mostly threaten ASVs.
Among them, replay attacks focus on using a pre-recorded
speech from a genuine speaker in order to deceive ASVs.
Speech could be recorded without the speakers consent or
even it can be generated by concatenating different parts of
speech from the genuine speaker. High tech devices including
smartphones, laptops and recorders, designed for recording,
complicate the situation, even more. As a result, it can be
the most potent threat to ASVs. The vulnerability of ASVs
to replay attacks first was investigated by [10], where authors
reported a significant increase in Equal Error Rate (EER) and
False Acceptance Rate (FAR) for ASVs. Other studies [11][19]
demonstrated that using Joint Factor Analysis (JFA) in which
FAR increased for the attack in this category. In [20], for a text-
independent system with GMM-UBM classifier considerable
increase in EER for ASVs is reported. As mentioned, there
are various low-cost ASVs that have saturated the market from
one hand, and on the other hand, easiness and availability of
devices required for replay attacks, lead to proposing counter-
measures for both sides [5]. Furthermore, for a replay attack,
there is no need for special speech processing techniques [21]
and unlike other types of spoofing, they can be used with
less knowledge about ASVs. Hence, they are more engaged
in spoofing attacks.
Therefore, in this study, considering the importance of
replay spoofing attacks, we focus on this type of attack, and
we will examine countermeasures for this threat. Among one
of the first countermeasures for a replay attack, [22] employed
fixed pass-phrase on a text-dependent ASVs. The detector
stores past access attempts with new attempts and then make
the decision. Results demonstrated improvement in EER while
they detected and recognized playback utterances. In [23],
authors use spectral ratio and modulation indexes in order to
detect spoofing in far-field recordings where noises increase
in recorded speech due to the distance. As a result of the
long-distance, the spectrum turns into a flattened one and then
the ability for modulation index is reduced. For classification
purposes, an SVM approach was used. Their results show that
the FAR of text-independent JFA is reduced for the ASVs.
Wang et al. [24] claims that licit recordings have just a specific
type of channel noise which is mixed with additional noise of
environment when a replay attack is presented in far-field. A
GMM-UBM classifier was employed in order to detect the
replay attack and the results show a significant decrease in
EER.
Ji et al. [20], captured CQCC features and feed them to
a decision tree classifier, Results showed EER of 10.8% for
this study on ASVspoof 2017 dataset. Adiban et al. [15]
combined different features including Mel-Frequency Cepstral
Coefficients (MFCC), RASTA-PLP, Modified Group Delay,
CQCC, i-vector, and Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients
(LPCC) and fed them to different classifiers such as SVM,
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural networks and GMMs
on ASVspoof 2017 dataset. The best performance was 10.31%
for EER. Shim et al. [25] investigated the problem of replay
spoofing attack detection and noise classification using multi-
task learning on playback devices, recording environments and
devices. Results showed a 30% improvement from 13.57% to
9.56% in terms of EER on ASVspoof 2017 dataset. A Discrete
Fourier Transform (DFT) was used in [26] for ASVspoof
2017 dataset. Then, a normalization was applied to features
in the q-log domain. For feature reduction, Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA) performed on initial feature. The best
performance was at the EER of 11.19%. Anti-spoofing task
on ASVspoof 2017 dataset was performed in [27] where a
CNN used as a deep learning approach with Max-Feature-Map
activation function. The proposed approach yielded 6.73%
as EER. Long-term temporal envelopes also extracted from
sub-band signals using Frequency Domain Linear Prediction
(FDLP) for feature extraction and GMM and CNN used for
classification were presented in [28]. The reported EER on
ASVspoof 2017 dataset was 9.70%. Sailor et al. [29] reported
EER of 8.89% on ASVspoof 2017 dataset using ConvRBM-
CC as features and GMMs as classification.
In the work presented in [30], inverted Mel-frequency
cepstral Coefficients (IMFCC), short time Fourier transform
(STFT), group delay gram (GD gram) and joint gram are
used as features. Extracted features fed into a residual neural
network (ResNet) classifier. The best results obtained in score
level fusion on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset, which are 0.66%
3and 0.0168 in terms of EER and t-DCF, respectively. Li et
al. in [31], implemented on ASVspoof 2019 dataset utilizes
multiple spectral features within the network, such as MFCC,
CQCC, Fbank, etc., and also butterfly unit (BU) for multi-task
learning. Results showed 0.67% and 0.0148 in terms of EER
and t-DCF, respectively. In [32], various features, including
MFCC, CQCC, and STFT are extracted and then fed into
ResNet classifier. Finally, in the fusion level EER of 0.28%
and t-DCF of 0.0074 are achieved. The study investigated in
[33], proposed a method for replay spoofing detection based
on various long range acoustic features and Deep Neural
Networks as classifiers. Their best combined system obtained
t-DCF of 0.1381 and EER of 5.95% for physical access on
AVSpoof 2019 dataset. The study in [34] is another work
in which the proposed system is implemented using Light
CNN (LCNN) based on various acoustic features such as CQT,
LFCC, and Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT). The best result
reported in this study is obtained in score level fusion which
is 0.54 and 0.0122 in terms of ERR and t-DCF, respectively.
In [35], authors utilize different spectral features, including
delta and acceleration MFCC (SDA MFCC), Inverted MFCC
(IMFCC), CQCC, sub-band centroid magnitude coefficients
(SCMC) features and i-vector in order to detect spoofing using
various shallow and deep classifiers such as GMM, SVM,
CNN, Convolutional Recurrent Neural Network (CRNN), 1D-
CNN and Wave U net, resulting in EER of 5.43 and t-DCF of
0.1465.
Table I summaries the replay attack countermeasures inves-
tigated in this section.
III. MODELS
A. Constant Q Cepstral Coefficient
In this work we used CQCCs. These features utilize Con-
stant Q Transform (CQT) [37] which is originally presented
for tasks related to music processing [38] and later it was
employed in speaker verification tasks [36]. Despite many
cepstral based features utilizing prevalent Fourier Transform
(FT), CQCCs employ Constant Q Transform (CQT) which
uses geometrically spaced frequency bins [36]. The main
difference between FT and CQT is that FT uses fixed time-
frequency resolution, however, CQT utilizes a constant Q
factor which leads to an increase in frequency resolution at
lower frequencies and also a better time resolution at higher
frequencies [39]. The Q factor is the ratio between the center
frequency fk and the bandwidth δf defined as.
Q =
fk
δf
. (1)
Details about CQT can be found in [39]. The CQCC extraction
steps are introduced as follows: Initially, for the given signal
x(n), CQT is engaged to obtain the spectrum. Then, the power
spectrum and subsequently the logarithmic power spectrum
are calculated. Eventually, in order to attain the cepstrum of
x(n), we apply the DCT as the inverse transformation in the
spectrum logarithm. The extraction steps of CQCC are shown
in Fig. 1. In addition, a comparison of the CQT and STFT
spectrogram for a speech signal is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. A comparison of CQT and STFT spectrogram.
B. Autoncoders
Autoencoder (AE) is a generative model that can be used
to extract substantial information and features. Accordingly,
an autoencoder is a neural network devised for the purpose
of learning an identity function in an unsupervised setting
to reconstruct high dimensional input data {x1;x2; ...;xm}
as outputs {xˆ1; xˆ2; ...; xˆm}. As mentioned in Sec. I, AE is
capable of capturing latent variables hidden in input samples.
Furthermore, AE extracts most informative and independent
features to compress the significant information of input sam-
ples [18]. Considering the sparse nature of noise, AE can both
capture the sparse features of the noisy input and also to map
them to a features space, capable of discriminating noisy and
clean samples. Accordingly, classifier is able to discriminate
both type of samples with high accuracy. The structure of the
autoencoder is depicted in Fig. 3. According to this structure,
the input data feature is reduced to reduced compact ones,
which can be considered as a feature vector. As shown in Fig.
3, L2 is a hidden layer. Eq. 2 defines the activation of unit i
in layer l.
a
(l)
i = f(
n∑
j=1
W
(l−1)
ij a
(l−1)
j + b
(1)
j ), (2)
where W represents weight and b denotes bias parameters.
According to Fig. 3, the input layer is considered as a(1) = x,
and in the output layer, a(3) = xˆ . In addition, in the hidden
layers, the sigmoid function is used as the activation function
f . However, the linear function is engaged in the output layer.
The objective function will be defined as:
J(W, b) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
(
1
2
||xi − xˆi||2) + λ
2
n1−1∑
l=1
s1−1∑
i=1
sl+1∑
j=1
(W
(l)
ji )
2,
(3)
where the parameters λ, nl and sl represent the strength of
regularization, the number of layers in the network and the
number of units in layer L1, respectively. In the training phase,
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of CQCC feature extraction [36].
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE REPLAY ATTACK COUNTERMEASURE (CM) METHODS, AND RESULTS.
Study CM Method EER% / t-DCF
Z. Ji, et al. [20] CQCC + GMM mean supervector-Gradient Boosting 10.8 / -
M. Adiban, et al. [15] MFCC, RASTA-PLP, CQCC, LPCC and i-vector + GMM, MLP and SVM 10.31 / -
H.-J. Shim et al. [25] Noise detection + neural network and Multi-task learning 9.56-13.57 / -
M. J. Alam, et al. [26] DFT-based features + feature normalization + PCA 11.9 / -
G. Lavrentyeva, et al. [27] Max-Feature-Map activation + CNN 6.37 / -
B. Wickramasinghe, et al. [28] FDLP (TC and RC) + GMM and CNN 9.70 / -
H. B. Sailor, et al. [29] ConvRBM-CC + GMM 8.89 / -
W. Cai, et al. [30] IMFCC,STFT, GD gram, joint Gram + ResNet 0.66 / 0.0168
R. Li, et al. [31] MFCC,CQCC, Fbank + BU 0.67 / 0.0148
M. Alzantot, et al. [32] MFCC,CQCC, STFT + ResNet 0.28 / 0.0074
R. K. Das, et al. [33] long rangeacoustic features + DNN 5.95 / 0.1381
G. Lavrentyeva, et al. [34] CQT, LFCC and DCT + LCNN 0.54 / 0.0122
B. Chettri, et al. [35] Spectral features, i-vector + Deep and Shallow Classifiers 5.43 / 0.1465
the objective function will be minimized with respect to the
parameters of W and b.
Fig. 3. Diagram of the Autoencoder.
C. Siamese Networks
Siamese Networks are one among all types of neural net-
works first used by [40][41] for different purposes. Most of
the works focused on their application in verification tasks
such as face recognition, signature recognition, etc. Siamese
networks take the sample as input and then maps it onto a
new latent space where similar samples have shorter distance
than non-similar ones. So the whole idea is finding a Target
Space where the semantic distance between inputs is found.
Thus, the Siamese networks can be very useful where the
training data does not contain sufficient information needed
for classification.
Hence, it can be realized that Siamese networks can be applied
in verification tasks. Spoofing detection is also a matter of
verification process of whether a voice is genuine or not. In
this work, considering the fake nature of spoof, a similarity
measure can be engaged to compare features extracted from
both data given to Siamese and then use another neural layer
for the final decision.
Architecture for this network is given in Fig. 4. It includes
two identical deep neural networks with the same configura-
tions in terms of weights, hyper-parameters, etc. Each one of
these neural networks is called leg of the network and both
are identical. One network is trained by input samples and
then a copy of the network is used with the same weights
as the other leg. The network can be a simple Multi-Layer
Perceptron (MLP) or other types of deep neural networks such
as CNN or RNN. The results are combined mostly using a
combination function and then the output is fed to a fully
connected network that is trained to produce a metric to show
if two samples are the same or different based on output given
by the combination function. So the task here is to minimize
the loss function based on the combination function. The final
fully connected layer can be performed by a sigmoid function
or one single neuron.
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this section, we will give information about the Model
we employed for each step of the whole framework. The
proposed system is depicted in Fig. 5. For the first step,
CQCC features with different dimensions are extracted from
the initial voice using the CQCC feature extractor. Thereupon,
for encoding features, we used an X×Y ×X structure where
X is the dimension size of the extracted features and Y is the
bottleneck dimension size. For training, we engaged a fine-
tuning back propagation, so the parameters will be improved
in each iteration. Then we used a Convolution Neural Network
(CNN) similar to the one used in [42]. CNN consisted of
3 convolutional layers, 3 max-pooling layers and, 2 Fully
Connected (FC) layers. Max-pooling operator have shown to
be sensitive to noisy input which is an important features.
Noisy input is one of the important characteristics of a replay
attack [43]. Two independent convolutional networks were
5Fully 
Connected 
Layer 
Weighs Merge 0/1
𝑋𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙
𝑋𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡
Fig. 4. Architecture of Siamese Networks.
Constant-Q 
Transform
Power 
Spectrum
LOG
Uniform 
Resampling
DCT
𝑥(𝑛) 𝐶𝑄𝐶𝐶(𝑝)
O
ri
gi
n
al
 S
am
p
le
Encoder
C
o
d
e
Decoder
R
ec
o
n
st
ru
ct
ed
  
Sa
m
p
le
𝐶𝑄𝐶𝐶′(𝑝)
𝑥′(𝑛)𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐ℎ
𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐ℎ
s𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑓/ 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒
CQCC Feature 
Extraction
Feature 
Reduction
CNN
CQCC Feature 
Extraction
Feature 
Reduction
CNN
Distance(T,O)Weights
Fig. 5. Diagram of our proposed Siamese network.
used in every layer with Max-Feature-Map (MFM) [44] as
the activation function. For compression purposes, a max-
pooling kernel was used with a size of 2×2. For the FC
layer, we used a softmax function to discriminate between
spoof and genuine samples. For improving the performance,
we employed a Highway structure from [45] in the final
layer which regulates information transfer considering this
fact that each neural network is a highway, where unimpeded
information can flow over several layers without attenuation.
We used ReLU as an affine transform function and sigmoid
as an activation function:
y = H(x,WH) ∗ T (x,WT ) + x.(1− T (x,WT )) (4)
In Eq. 4, H,T are the affine transform function and activation
function, respectively. The weighting matrices Wh,WT are
updated in training process. x represents the input and the
dot operator (.) is used to denote element-wise multiplication.
Finally y is output of highway function. Probability of a voice
to be a spoof or not is calculated by a softmax layer using the
following equation:
P (ci|z) = e
zTw∑C
i=1 e
zTi w
, (5)
where ci is the ith class that we try to calculate whether sample
x is a member of this class or not. z is the given feature vector
and C is the number of whole classes, which in our case is
two, spoof and genuine.
One of the trained CNNs is fed with genuine fixed-length
vectors obtained from autoencoder and the other ones are fed
with the test sample. If they are similar they will get the same
class and otherwise, they will be placed in different classes.
As [46], we tried to use dropout for preventing overfitting with
mini-batches of 200 samples. For loss function we used Cross
Entropy:
CE = −
C′∑
i=1
ti log(f(si))− (1− ti) log(1− f(si)), (6)
where ti is the true label of class i, f(si) is the calculated
label for sample si and C ′ indicates the number of total classes
6in the dataset which is 2 in our case. Finally, a simple loss
function is used to calculate the distance between each feature
to take the value of 1 (spoof) if it is more than 0.5 and 0
(genuine) otherwise.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Dataset
The ASVspoof 2019 challenge [47] is introduced to expand
the goals of the previous challenges ASVspoof 2015 [48]
and ASVspoof 2017 [49]. The main purpose in ASVspoof
2015 was to introduce countermeasure systems for detecting
spoofed/non-spoofed speech in which spoofed speech was
implemented based on either text-to-speech (TTS) or voice
conversion (VC) approaches. In addition, the 2017 ASVspoof
Challenge was presented to guide studies to introduce coun-
termeasure systems for detecting replay spoofing attacks.
Subsequently, the ASVspoof 2019 challenge was presented
to complete the objectives of the two previous challenges
and provided two subsets including Logical Access (LA) and
Physical Access (PA). In the PA scenario, the spoofing attacks
are based on replay attacks where an adversary tries to record
a genuine speech and replay it in order to deceive the ASV
system. PA includes three subsets: Training, Development, and
Evaluation sets.
For training and development, a dataset was created using
a combination of three room sizes, with three levels of
reverberation and three different speaker-to-ASV microphone
distances, and in total 27 configurations. The replay attack
dataset comprises nine different configurations from three
different categories of distances and three different qualities.
Evaluation dataset consisted of 137457 trials including both
replay spoofed speech and bona fide with different configura-
tions with unique speakers. The statistics of each of subsets is
summarized in Table II.
TABLE II
PHYSICAL ACCESS SCENARIO STATISTICS FOR ASVSPOOF 2019
DATABASE
Subset #Speaker #UtteranceMale Female Bona fide Spoof
Training 8 12 5400 48600
Development 4 6 5400 24300
Evaluation 21 27 18090 116640
Total 33 45 28890 189540
B. Evaluation Metrics
The ASVspoof 2019 challenge is a binary classification task,
in which utterances from real humans are labeled as a positive
class and spoof attacks are labeled as a negative class. Tandem
Detection Cost Function (t-DCF) [50] is adopted by ASVspoof
2019 as a standard measure metric, which is based on detection
theory and can be specified for the envisioned application.
Isolation of different systems (such as CM and ASV) is a key
feature of tandem systems and t-DCF. We also use EER as an
additional metric to measure our system performance.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Baseline System
The organizers of the challenge ASVspoof 2019 have in-
troduced two systems as a baseline [47] for participators. The
proposed method in the baseline system is based on CQCC and
Linear Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (LFCC) [51] features
and GMM classifiers. Accordingly, they extract CQCC and
LFCC features from training data and then two GMMs (one
GMM for the bona fide and the other for spoofed data) with
512 components to learn the model by EM iterations (training
GMMs). In the next step, the score for each trial is computed
using these GMMs. The results for the development set and
evaluation set of physical access scenario in terms of t-DCF
and EER are presented in Table III.
TABLE III
T-DCF AND EER RESULTS FOR TWO BASELINE COUNTERMEASURES ON
PHYSICAL ACCESS SCENARIOS FOR BOTH DEVELOPMENT SET AND
EVALUATION SET [47][52].
Baseline System Development Set Evaluation SetEER% t-DCF EER% t-DCF
LFCC-GMM 11.96 0.2554 13.54 0.3017
CQCC-GMM 9.87 0.1953 11.04 0.2454
B. Proposed System Configuration
As we have mentioned, our proposed system consists of
three main parts. First, extracting the CQCC features with dif-
ferent dimensions from input speech. Second, dimensionality
feature reduction using autoencoder to different dimensions.
Finally, using the Siamese network as a classifier. This process
includes the Training and Evaluation phases:
1) Training Phase: To train our system, we extract CQCC
features from training data (for both bona fide and spoofed
data). In the following, we trained an autoencoder with
different bottleneck dimensions using the extracted features
separately with Siamese networks. Accordingly, we take into
account two objectives of training the autoencoder. First, we
try to reduce the data dispersion. More importantly, autoen-
coder is trained by considering the noise in spoofed speech,
leading to achieving more valuable data for spoofing detection.
As the final step, we trained Siamese Networks (including two
CNNs) as our classifier. In order to train these CNNs, first, we
divided our dataset into two balanced parts (one part is used
for first CNN and another part for the second one). Afterwards,
we randomly selected data form each part without replacing it
and then apply each selected data considering their labels to
the network assigned to that part. Finally, CNNs learn whether
two input data are from equal classes or not and subsequently
their shared weights are updated. Here, different configurations
of CNNs, indicated as Siamese Network Config”, were used
to observe the impacts of using various filters with differ-
ent sizes on performance. Considering the effects of using
different feature extraction methods, we used three different
configurations of CNN. In this regard, we run our systems on
development data to obtain our configurations and tune their
parameters. Therefore, the first configuration, indicated by
Config. 1, contains three layers of convolutional and average-
pooling layers and 1 hidden layer. It holds 160, 200, and 100
7filters, respectively. In the hidden layer, we have 300 nodes and
3 pooling width. For the second configuration (Config. 2), we
have the same architecture, with a change in the number of
the hidden nodes to 500. In the third configuration (Config. 3),
we just replaced average-pooling with max-pooling to observe
the impact of the max filter instead of average-pooling one.
2) Evaluation Phase: In the evaluation phase, similar to the
training phase, we extract different dimensions of the CQCC
features from the evaluation set. We then used an autoencoder
to reduce the dimensions of the extracted features. At the
classification level, we applied evaluation data to one of the
trained CNN in the previous step. And the input of another
CNN is a fixed bona fide speech which is randomly selected
from the training set. So for each evaluation data, we will
check whether the input data matches the fixed bona fide
speech. If it matches, we will consider it as a bona fide,
otherwise, it will be considered as a spoofed speech. Finally,
we repeat this cycle with 100 fixed bona fide data which are
randomly selected from the training set without considering
their gender or number of speakers and finally, we get the
majority votes. As mentioned in the training phase, it should
be reminded that we used development trials in order to tune
the parameters of our system.
C. Siamese Networks Results and Analysis
Results obtained from different classifier setups are in-
vestigated in this section. Table IV shows EER and t-DCF
achieved from different dimensions of CQCC and different
configurations of our classifier without any dimensionality
reduction on the development set and evaluation set. As shown
in Table IV, the best results in each classifier configuration
belong to 90-dimensional CQCC. Among these results, the
best result is achieved from Siamese Config. 3. It can be seen
this result improves the baseline system 10.42% and 0.2344
in terms of EER and t-DCF, respectively.
Discussion: As explained in the introduction, using descriptive
CQCC through a higher dimension of features can be effective
in the spoofing detection task due to the fact that it gives a bet-
ter resolution at different frequencies. This leads to a detailed
description of noisy frequencies and usual ones. On the other
hand, increasing the dimension of the features might trigger
redundancy. Thus, we are looking for a balance between higher
resolution and lower redundancy. Experimental results show
that 90-dimensional CQCC achieves the equilibrium point. In
addition, it is obvious that results for Config. 3 are better
than the other two configurations. The key point for this
configuration is that it has fewer hidden nodes than the second
configuration and so we can realize that increasing the number
of hidden nodes is helpful up to some point and after that the
performance decays. Furthermore, it shows that using max-
pooling layer can be more helpful than average-pooling. This
also comes back to the noisy nature of the given task, where
the noises effects can be removed using the average-pooling
[43], while max-pooling will result in selecting noisier values
at the selection layer.
TABLE IV
CQCC DIMENSION EFFECTS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED
SYSTEM WITH DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS OF CNN CONFIGURATIONS
NOTED AS ”SIAMESE CONFIGS”.
Siamese Network Configs.
Config. 1 Config. 2 Config. 3
Set CQCC
Dims.
EER% t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER% t-DCF
D
ev
.
30 2.17 0.0411 2.35 0.0437 1.96 0.0391
60 1.29 0.0240 1.84 0.0319 1.65 0.0324
90 1.09 0.0223 1.38 0.0245 0.92 0.0183
120 1.46 0.0247 1.93 0.0386 1.24 0.0207
E
va
l.
30 6.80 0.1550 7.12 0.1649 5.66 0.1371
60 4.19 0.1072 5.57 0.1323 3.78 0.0883
90 3.27 0.0745 4.13 0.1086 3.02 0.0627
120 4.73 0.1251 6.29 0.1528 4.11 0.0854
D. Autoencoder Performance
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the effects of using the autoencoder
in our proposed system. Accordingly, we used the autoencoder
to reduce the dimensions of the 90-dimensional CQCC. As
shown in Figs. 6 and 7, best results are obtained from the
70-dimensional bottleneck of autoencoder for each Siamese
configuration. Similar to previous results, the best results
belong to Siamese Config. 3 that outperforms the baseline
system by 10.72% and 0.2344 in terms of EER and t-DCF,
respectively.
Discussion: Figs. 6 and 7 show the same results for three
different configurations, which were analyzed in the previous
discussion. But it shows that the better performance for the
proposed approach is given for higher bottleneck features.
The purpose of using autoencoder is to consider the impact of
noise, but attaching too much importance to the noise effect
is associated with ignoring valuable information which leads
to increment in EER. Therefore, there is a trade-off, as much
as noise is considered, information is also missed and vice-
versa. Consequently, there is an optimum value where most
of the noises are considered and informative values are still
preserved, which is 70 in this case.
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Fig. 6. Effects of dimension reduction by autoencoder on EER for evaluation
set with CQCC vector size of 90 on the proposed system.
Table V summarizes the best results obtained by different
configurations of the proposed systems and baseline systems.
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Fig. 7. Effects of dimension reduction by autoencoder on t-DCF for evaluation
set with CQCC vector size of 90 on the proposed system.
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF THE BEST RESULTS OBTAINED BY DIFFERENT SIAMESE
NETWORKS CONFIGURATIONS WITH BASELINE SYSTEMS.(CQCC VECTOR
SIZE = 90, AUTOENCODER BOTTLENECK SIZE = 70)
Dev. Eval.
System EER% t-DCF EER% t-DCF
Baseline 1 (LFCC + GMM) 11.96 0.2554 13.54 0.3017
Baseline 2 (CQCC + GMM) 9.87 0.1953 11.04 0.2454
Conf. 1 CQCC 1.98 0.1529 3.27 0.0745Siamese CQCC + AE 0.23 0.0027 0.80 0.0208
Network Conf. 2 CQCC 2.40 0.0448 4.13 0.1086Configs. CQCC + AE 0.29 0.0196 0.91 0.0278
Conf. 3 CQCC 1.77 0.0212 3.02 0.0627CQCC + AE 0.00 0.0041 0.62 0.0110
E. Performance With Different Training Data sizes
In order to measure the performance of our proposed system
in face of different training data, we used different sizes
of the training set to train the system. In this regard, we
randomly divided the training set into five equal folds without
considering the gender or number of speakers. In each step,
the training set was raised fold by fold. For each fold, the
system is trained similar to what we do in the training phase.
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the effects of using different sizes of
the training set. As expected, the results were improved by
increasing the volume of the training data. It is noteworthy
that our proposed system could achieve better results than the
baseline system on the evaluation set using only 60% of the
training data. By 80% of data as the training set, the proposed
approach outperforms the baseline system.
Discussion: The results for this part demonstrate better out-
comes for more amount of data which is kind of obvious.
Increasing training data helps the classifier to figure out the
data model which leads to better prediction of test samples,
however, considering 60% of whole data as a training set
provides comparable results to the baseline system, and 80%
of the whole data gives a significant improvement over the
baseline system. Another important subject is that the proposed
system demonstrates impressive results using less training
data. This makes the proposed approach more robust to
missing data. It means the proposed system can be applied to
tasks with less training data and since data scarcity is a serious
issue, it is a strong advantage for the proposed approach.
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Fig. 8. The Effects of Using Different Sizes of the training set on the EER of
the best configuration of Proposed System (CNN Config. 3, 90-dimensional
CQCC, 70-dimensional AE bottleneck).
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Fig. 9. The Effects of Using Different Sizes of the training set on the t-DCF
of the best configuration of Proposed System (CNN Config. 3, 90-dimensional
CQCC, 70-dimensional AE bottleneck).
F. Effect of Siamese Networks on Performance
To evaluate the performance of the Siamese networks,
the results for employed Siamese networks and single CNN
are compared at table VI. The hyper-parameters of CQCC
and autoencoder are tuned based on the best performance
of the system. Therefore, the dimension of CQCC is fixed
on 90, and for the autoencoder we used bottleneck with
a size of 70. Three different configurations are used for
each case. The results indicate that Siamese networks are
effective at improving the results compared with single CNN.
TABLE VI
EFFECT OF EMPLOYED SIAMSE NETWORK ON THE PERFORMANCE (CQCC
VECTOR SIZE = 90, BOTTLENECK SIZE= 70).
Siamese Network CNN
Set Configurations EER t-DCF EER t-DCF
Dev.
Conf. 1 0.23 0.0027 0.94 0.0212
Conf. 2 0.29 0.0196 1.21 0.0403
Conf. 3 0.00 0.0041 0.66 0.0182
Eval.
Conf. 1 0.80 0.0208 3.25 0.1339
Conf. 2 0.91 0.0278 5.11 0.2726
Conf. 3 0.62 0.0110 3.05 0.1406
9Discussion: Siamese networks have shown promising re-
sults in different classification tasks and their application was
restricted to classification tasks with an unlimited number of
classes. Hence, their effectiveness was overlooked in such
tasks. However, as Table VI indicates, the Siamese networks
improve the performance of the system. Although CNN yields
satisfactory results, it does show weaknesses in stability. In
other words, the system performance varies with different
configurations, and the results for the evaluation set are much
worse than the results for the development set. This is mostly
because both classes are trained on one network which some-
how reveals some evidence of over-fitting. In addition, as a
result of the network discriminates between different samples,
the network has difficulty in handling the different inputs,
especially in case of using average-pooling which removes the
noises. On the other hand, for Siamese networks, the difference
of generated output is learnt and this is one step in addition to
normal classification. In this case, even with the average for
pooling, the model is learnt through the final layer. However,
the average pooling would remove the noises and leads to a
drop in performance of classification.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel replay spoofing countermeasure sys-
tem for ASVs based on physical access ASVspoof 2019
dataset. In this study, different configurations of CNNs in the
structure of Siamese Network were investigated for the pur-
pose of classification. Moreover, the autoencoder is employed
to resolve the dispersion problem of well-known CQCC fea-
tures. The experimental results confirmed the high efficiency
of Siamese Network for spoofing detection. Additionally,
autoencoders could significantly consider and utilize noise
and eliminate redundant and irrelevant information of CQCC
features, resulting in outperforming the baseline system. Be-
sides, the results show that the proposed method could achieve
comparable performance using a smaller amount of training set
(only 60% training set) which reflects the effectiveness and the
scalability of our system.
For future work, an integrated framework can be proposed
to identify each of four general attacks on ASVspoof systems
and apply appropriate countermeasures regarding the attack. It
is a necessary task since every ASV system is always facing
other types of attacks and has to be able to confront each type
of attack.
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